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Evaluating competing perspectives towards undeclared work: some lessons 
from Bulgaria 
 
Abstract 
When explaining and tackling the undeclared economy in Central and Eastern Europe, participants 
have been conventionally viewed as rational economic actors. They engage in undeclared work 
when the benefits outweigh the costs. Participation is thus deterred by increasing the sanctions 
and/or probability of being caught. Recently, however, an alternative social actor approach has 
emerged which views participants as engaging in undeclared work when their norms, values and 
beliefs (i.e., citizen morale) do not align with the laws and regulations (i.e., state morale). Here, 
therefore, initiatives to develop greater symmetry between civic and state morale are pursued. To 
evaluate the validity and effectiveness of these competing explanations and policy approaches, 
2,004 face-to-face interviews conducted in Bulgaria in late 2015 are reported. Logit marginal effects 
regression analysis reveals no association between participation in undeclared work and the 
perceived level of penalties and risk of detection, but a strong significant association with the level 
of asymmetry between citizen and state morale; the greater the asymmetry, the higher is the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work. The paper concludes by discussing the implications 
for explaining and tackling undeclared work.   
 
Keywords: informal sector; tax morale; tax evasion; institutional theory; Bulgaria.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, it has been widely recognised that the undeclared economy is a persistent feature of 
Central and Eastern European economies. With on average a quarter of national income not declared 
to the authorities (Williams and Schneider 2016), explaining and tackling this sphere has become a 
policy priority. Numerous studies highlight the extent and nature of the undeclared economy in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Kukk and Staehr 2014; Sauka and Putni৆ãWallace and Latcheva 
2006; Williams et al. 2013). Rather less attention has been paid to explaining this sphere and few if 
any studies have evaluated the different ways in which this sector can be tackled. However, unless 
the rationales for participating in the undeclared economy are understood and effective strategies 
developed to tackle monetary transactions not declared to the state for tax, social security and/or 
labour law purposes, governments will continue to suffer public revenue losses, workers from poor 
working conditions, and legitimate businesses from unfair competition (Andrews et al. 2011; ILO 
2014; OECD 2012; TUC 2008).  
 Conventionally, the dominant way of explaining those engaged in undeclared work has been 
to view them as rational economic actors. They work on an undeclared basis when the pay-off is 
greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). To 
tackle undeclared work, therefore, the focus is upon increasing the actual or perceived costs of 
working undeclared by raising the sanctions and/or probability of being caught. In the past decade 
or so, nevertheless, a ³social actor´ approach has emerged. This explains participation in undeclared 
work as occurring when tax morale is low, defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm et 
al. 2010; Cummings et al. 2009; Kirchler 2007; Murphy 2008; Torgler 2007). Its approach is thus to 
raise tax morale by aligning the informal institutions (i.e., the norms, values and beliefs of citizens) 
with the codified laws and regulations of the formal institutions (Alm et al. 2012; Alm and Torgler 
2011; Torgler 2012). The aim of this paper, therefore, is to begin to evaluate these competing 
perspectives towards explaining and tackling undeclared work. To do so, a survey is reported 
conducted in Bulgaria.  
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 In section 2, therefore, these rational economic actor and social actor policy approaches are 
reviewed in order to formulate some hypotheses for evaluation. Section 3 then introduces the data 
and methodology to evaluate these hypotheses, namely a logit regression analysis of 2,004 face-to-
face interviews undertaken in late 2015 in Bulgaria. The findings are reported in section 4. 
Revealing no association between participation in undeclared work and the perceived level of 
sanctions and probability of being caught, but a strong association with the level of tax morale, 
section 5 then concludes by discussing the implications for explaining and tackling undeclared work 
in Bulgaria and beyond.   
 Throughout this paper, and mirroring the consensus in the literature, undeclared work refers 
to paid work which is legal in all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social 
security and/or labour law purposes (Aliyev 2015; Barsoum 2015; Boels 2014; European 
Commission 2007; Hodosi 2015; OECD 2012; Pfau-Effinger 2017; Williams 2014a,b). If it is not 
legal in all other respects, it is not considered undeclared work. If the goods and/or services 
exchanged are illegal (e.g., selling illegal drugs, stolen cattle) for instance, then this is not part of 
undeclared work but is the wider criminal economy. If unpaid, it is part of the unpaid subsistence 
sphere.  
 
Perspectives towards undeclared work 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, there has been widespread recognition that although the undeclared 
economy is a greater share of all economic activity in developing economies, it is a persistent and 
prevalent phenomenon in all global regions (ILO, 2013; Jütting and Laiglesia 2009; Williams and 
Schneider 2016), including the post-socialist transition economies (Williams et al. 2013). The result 
is that tackling the undeclared economy has become a prominent issue on the policy agendas of not 
only supra-national agencies but also governments across the world (European Commission 2007; 
OECD 2012; Williams 2014a, 2017).  
Reviewing the literature on how to explain and tackle the undeclared economy, it becomes 
quickly apparent that two distinct perspectives exist. On the one hand, there is a rational economic 
actor approach that seeks to tackle undeclared work by ensuring that payoff from engaging in 
undeclared work is outweighed by the costs, and on the other hand, a social actor approach that 
views undeclared work as arising when there is low tax morale. Here, each is considered in turn. 
 
Rational economic actor perspective 
 
The origins of the rational economic actor perspective towards undeclared work lie in the classic 
treatises of Cesare Beccaria (Beccaria 1797) and Jeremy Bentham (Bentham 1788) that established 
a utilitarian theory of crime. This represents those engaged in criminal activities as rational actors. 
They weigh up the risks and opportunities, and engage in criminal acts if the penalty and probability 
of being caught is perceived as smaller than the benefits to be gained from their actions. This 
approach came to prominence in the late 1960s when it was popularised by the Chicago school of 
economics (Becker, 1968). During the early 1970s, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) then applied it 
to explaining tax non-compliance. They viewed the non-compliant as rational economic actors who 
evade paying tax when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished. 
Governments therefore needed to alter the cost/benefit ratio confronting those considering 
engagement in tax non-compliance. This subsequently became the prominent approach of many 
governments, and was pursued by increasing the actual and/or perceived sanctions and probability 
of detection, thus raising the costs of engagement (e.g., Grabiner 2000; Hasseldine and Li 1999; Job 
et al. 2007; Richardson and Sawyer 2001; Williams 2017).  
Indeed, this rational economic actor perspective is dominant in Bulgaria, the country studied 
in this paper. Firstly, sanctions have been increased and secondly, the likelihood of detection 
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improved such as by increasing workplace inspections and by improving data sharing and matching 
across government in order to identify individuals potentially engaged in undeclared work 
(Dzhekova and Williams 2014; Williams and Franic 2016a; Williams et al. 2014). A review of the 
measures used to tackle undeclared work in Bulgaria between 2005 and 2009, the majority were 
deterrence measures, with 64 measures alone related to tougher snactions and imporving the 
probability of being caught through monitoring, data exchange, and more efficient inspections (CSD 
2009). For example, amendments to the Labour Code in 2006 and 2008 introduced higher penalties 
and fines for those engaged in undeclared work (Loukanova and Beslov 2007; Daskalova 2013). 
Employers that hire workers without an employment contract wer now liable to a penalty of BGN 
 ¼ SHU ZRUNHU FRPSDUHG with %*1  ¼ previously. Moreover, labour 
inspectors were given the right to temporarily freeze the activity of offending businesses.  
 Despite the adoption of this rational economic actor approach both in Bulgaria and well 
beyond, the evidence-base that increasing the penalties and probability of being caught reduces 
undeclared work is less than conclusive when this has been evaluated across the globe (Alm et al. 
1992, 1995; Slemrod et al. 2001; Varma and Doob 1998). Indeed, this is also found to be the case 
in the one previous study evaluating this rational economic actor approach in Bulgaria. Reporting 
data from 1,000 Bulgarian respondents interviewed in 2013 as part of a Eurobarometer survey on 
undeclared work, Williams and Franic (2016a) find no association between either the perceived 
level of penalties and participation in the undeclared economy, or the perceived probability of 
detection and the likelihood of engaging in undeclared work. To further explore in relation to 
Bulgaria the validity of this rational economic actor approach using a newer dataset based on a more 
extensive population sample, therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
   
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): the higher the perceived sanctions and risk of being 
caught, the lower is the likelihood of engagement in the undeclared economy. 
H1a: the higher the perceived sanctions, the lower the likelihood of engagement in the 
undeclared economy. 
H1b: the higher the perceived risks of being caught, the lower the likelihood of engagement 
in the undeclared economy. 
 
Social actor perspective 
 
Over the past decade, a perspective has emerged which recognises that citizens are not always 
rational economic actors. The key argument underpinning this approach is that many citizens are 
found to voluntarily comply with the law. They do not operate in the undeclared economy even 
when the benefit/cost ratio strongly intimates that they should be doing so (Alm et al. 2010; Kirchler 
2007; Murphy 2008; Murphy and Harris 2007). To explain this, a ³social actor´ model has emerged. 
This regards engagement in undeclared work to be an outcome of low tax morale, by which is meant 
a low intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm and Torgler 2006, 2011; Cummings et al. 2009; 
McKerchar et al. 2013; Torgler 2011; Torgler and Schneider 2007). The resultant aim is to improve 
their tax morale so as to improve the level of voluntary compliance and thus reduce engagement in 
undeclared work (Kirchler 2007; Torgler 2007, 2011).   
 This perspective has its roots in the classic work of Georg von Schanz (1890) who 
highlighted the existence of a tax contract between the state and its citizens. Over six decades later, 
the German ³Cologne school of tax psychology´ sought to measure the strength of this tax contract 
using tax morale (see Schmölders 1952, 1960, 1962; Strümpel 1969) and viewed it as strongly 
correlated with tax non-compliance (Schmölders 1960). Although the rise of the rational economic 
actor approach from the 1970s onwards led to the demise of this social actor approach, over the past 
decade or so, it has begun to re-emerge (Alm et al. 2012; Kirchler 2007; Torgler 2007, 2011). At 
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the heart of this approach is the objective of improving tax morale in order to elicit greater self-
regulation (Alm and Torgler 2011; Torgler 2012; Williams 2014a; Williams 2017).  
 In the past few years, this social actor approach has been understood through the lens of 
institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder 2008; North 1990). From this institutionalist perspective, 
all societies possess formal institutions, which are codified laws and regulations that define the legal 
rules of the game. They also possess informal institutions, which are the ³socially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels´ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Adopting this institutional perspective, tax morale 
therefore measures the extent to which the formal institutions (here termed ³state morale´) and 
informal institutions (here termed ³citizen morale´) are aligned. When there is asymmetry, tax 
morale is low and engagement in undeclared work more prevalent (Webb et al. 2009; Williams and 
Horodnic 2017; Williams and Franic 2016b). In the only study of tax morale so far conducted in 
Bulgaria using data from the 2013 Eurobarometer survey, the finding is that there is a strong 
statistically significant correlation between the level of tax morale and the likelihood of engaging 
in undeclared work; the lower the tax morale, the greater the likelihood of participating in 
undeclared work (Williams and Franic 2016a). To again further explore the validity of this 
perspective using a newer dataset and more extensive population sample, therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Social actor hypothesis (H2): the higher is tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
engagement in the undeclared economy. 
 
Competing or complementary perspectives  
 
Currently, most governments across the world explain participation in undeclared work from a 
rational economic actor perspective; they seek to increase the penalties and probability of being 
caught to deter engagement in undeclared work (see Dekker et al. 2010; Williams et al. 2013). When 
the social actor perspective has been considered, it has been viewed in two ways. On the one hand, 
some scholars have seen it as an alternative to the rational actor perspective. For them, therefore, 
the social actor perspective adopts a different view of participants and is not compatible with a 
rational economic actor perspective and therefore should be treated as an alternative approach 
(Eurofound 2013; Williams 2014a). On the other hand, however, there has been recently a surge of 
interest in whether these are complementary rather than competing approaches. The primary 
manifestation of this view is the ³slippery slope´ approach. This argues that governments can pursue 
not only ³enforced´ compliance by increasing the penalties and risks of detection and therefore the 
power of authorities, but also ³voluntary´ compliance by improving tax morale and therefore trust 
in authorities (Kirchler et al. 2008; Kogler et al. 2015; Kastlunger et al. 2013; Khurana and Diwan 
2014; Muehlbacher et al. 2011; Prinz et al. 2013; Wahl et al. 2010; Windebank and Horodnic 2017). 
The argument has been that pursuing both is the most effective means of tackling undeclared work 
(Kogler et al. 2015). 
There is an emergent recognition however, that if these approaches are pursued together, they 
may have complex interaction and mediating effects. Applying higher penalties and risks of 
detection for example, might not always lead to the same outcome. When tax morale is already high, 
some have argued that increasing the penalties and risks of detection might lead to greater non-
compliance, rather than less, not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state and its citizens 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Blumenthal et al. 1998; Brehm and Brehm 1981; Chang and Lai 2004; 
Kirchler et al. 2014; Murphy and Harris 2007). The consequent intimation is that raising the 
perceived sanctions and detection risks may have different effects on engagement in the undeclared 
economy depending on the level of tax morale. Until now, however, little if any research has been 
conducted on their complex interactions and dynamics. To start to evaluate this, therefore, the 
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relationships between deterrents, tax morale and engagement in the undeclared economy can start 
to be tested by evaluating the following hypothesis:  
 
Interactions hypothesis (H3): the effect of the perceived sanctions and risk of being caught on 
the likelihood of engaging in the undeclared economy varies at different levels of tax morale. 
H3a: the effect of perceived sanctions on the likelihood of engaging in the undeclared 
economy varies at different levels of tax morale. 
H3b: the effect of perceived risk of being caught on the likelihood of engagement in the 
undeclared economy varies at different levels of tax morale. 
 
Data and Variables 
 
Data 
 
To evaluate these competing perspectives and thus hypotheses, data is here used from 2,004 face-
to-face interviews undertaken in Bulgaria in late 2015. This representative national survey analysed 
not only attitudes towards undeclared work, but also who purchases and supplies undeclared work, 
and the relationship between participation in undeclared work and the perceived sanctions and 
probability of being caught, and level of tax morale. To collect this data, a multi-stage random 
(probability) sampling methodology was used to ensure that on the issues of gender, age, region and 
locality size, the national level sample, as well as each level of the sample, was representative in 
proportion to its population size. In every household the ³closest birthday´ rule was applied to select 
the respondents to answer the survey, while every subsequent address was determined by the 
standard ³random route´ procedure.   
 
Variables 
 
To evaluate whether increasing the perceived sanctions and probability of being caught, and higher 
tax morale, reduces the likelihood of engagement in the undeclared economy, the dependent variable 
used is a dummy variable with recorded value 1 for those who answered ³yes´ to the question: ³Did 
you yourself carry out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months? Here we mean again 
activities which you were paid for which were not or not fully reported to the tax authorities´, or 
value 0 otherwise.  
To evaluate the association between engagement in the undeclared economy and the policy 
approaches, three explanatory variables have been employed. Firstly, to evaluate whether the 
perceived probability of being caught is correlated with engagement in the undeclared economy, a 
dummy variable has been used describing the perceived risk of being detected, with value 0 for a 
very small or fairly small risk, and value 1 for fairly high or very high risk. Secondly, to evaluate 
whether sanctions are correlated with engagement, a dummy variable has been used, describing the 
expected sanctions, with value 0 for those asserting that the normal tax or social security 
contributions would be due, and value 1 for those stating that the normal tax or social security 
contributions due plus there would be a fine, or imprisonment.  
Third and finally, to evaluate the association between engagement in wage under-reporting 
and tax morale, an interval variable was used by constructing an index of self-reported attitudes 
towards the acceptability of undeclared work based on a 10-point Likert scale. Rather than use a 
single question to assess tax morale, this survey uses a range of questions by asking the following:  
 
Now I would like to know how you would rate various actions or behaviours. For each of 
them, please tell me to what extent you find it acceptable or not. Please use the following 
VFDOH³´PHDQV WKDW \RX ILQG LW DEVROXWHO\XQDFFHSWDEOH DQG³´PHDQV WKDW\RX ILQG LW
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absolutely acceptable: (1) someone receives welfare payments without entitlement; (2) an 
individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment received to 
the tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared; (3) A firm is hired by 
a household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the tax or social security 
authorities; (4) a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to 
the tax or social security authorities; (5) a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages 
paid to him/her are not officially declared and (6) someone evades taxes by not declaring or 
only partially declaring their income. 
 
Collating the responses to these six questions, and giving equal weighting to each response, an 
aggregate ³tax morale index´ LVFRQVWUXFWHGIRUHDFKLQGLYLGXDO7KH&URQEDFK¶V$OSKDFRHIILFLHQW
of the scale is 0.87 which shows a good internal consistency of the scale (Kline 2000). The index is 
represented here in the 10-point Likert scale original format. The lower the index value, the higher 
is the tax morale. 
Drawing upon previous studies across the Central and Eastern Europe evaluating the 
important socio-demographic and socio-economic variables influencing participation in undeclared 
work (Williams and Horodnic 2015a,b; Williams and Padmore 2013a,b), the control variables 
selected are:  
 Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for women and 1 for men. 
 Age: an interval variable indicating the exact age of the respondent. 
 Marital status: a categorical variable with value 0 for single persons, value 1 for 
married/remarried and value 2 for cohabiting. 
 Household size: a categorical variable with value 0 for a one adult household, value 1 for a 
two adult household, value 2 for a three adult household, and value 4 for a household with 
four or more adult people. 
 Employment status: a categorical variable with value 0 for employed, value 1 for self-
employed, value 2 for retired, value 3 for unemployed, and value 4 for student and inactive. 
 Financial situation: a categorical variable with value 0 for no money problems, value 1 for 
just comfortable, value 2 for maintaining, and value 3 for struggling.  
 Personal income: a categorical variable for the level of personal formal income per month 
with value 0 for no income, value 1 for less than 350 euros, value 2 for 350-699 euros, value 
3 for 700-999 euros and value 4 for 1000 euros or more per month. 
 Type of locality: a categorical variable with value 0 for rural area or village, value 1 for small 
or middle-sized town, value 2 for large town and value 4 for Skopje.  
 Region: a categorical variable with value 0 for North Central, value 1 for North Eastern, 
value 2 for North Western, value 3 for South Central, value 4 for South Eastern, and value 
5 for South Western.  
Given that there were a considerable number of missing values and inconclusive answers (i.e., 
refusal and ³GRQ¶WNQRZ´) across the dependent and independent variables, multiple imputation was 
used to predict the values. This is done using a system of chained equations for each variable with 
missing values, with fifty imputations simulated for each missing value. Furthermore, population 
weights are applied based on age and gender to correct for under- and over-representation in the 
sample and to ensure that the statistics are representative of the population.  
To evaluate the relationship between participation in undeclared work and the perceived 
sanctions and probability of being caught, and the level of tax morale, a logit marginal effects 
regression analysis is here used. Before analysing the findings, and given the sensitive topic being 
investigated, the reliability of the data collected needs to be briefly discussed. In 94 per cent of the 
interviews, the interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation from the participant when 
answering the questions, and average cooperation in 5 per cent of cases. Cooperation was found to 
be poor in only 1 per cent of cases. No evidence that respondents were reticent in answering the 
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questions, was thus identified, perhaps displaying how the undeclared economy, although formally 
illegal, is widely deemed a socially legitimate endeavour in Bulgaria. Below, in consequence, the 
findings are reported. 
 
Findings 
 
Of the 2,004 respondents interviewed in 2015 in Bulgaria, 10 per cent reported participating in 
undeclared work in the last 12 months, and they reported earning a mean income of 1,315 euros per 
annum from their undeclared work. Examining the activities undertaken, 18 per cent of these 
undeclared workers had sold goods and services (other than foodstuffs), 15 per cent provided home 
maintenance and improvement services, 12 per cent had provided gardening services, 12 per cent 
house removal services, 11 per cent had sold goods and services associated with their hobby, 9 per 
cent had sold food produce, 8 per cent had engaged in domestic cleaning, 7 per cent worked as a 
waiter or waitress, 7 per cent car repairs, 6 per cent baby-sitting, 5 per cent tutoring, 2 per cent IT 
assistance and 2 per cent ironing clothes.  
 Only 17 per cent of this undeclared work was undertaken as waged employment for 
businesses. The remaining 83 per cent was conducted on a self-employed basis, with 19 per cent 
conducted for friends, colleagues or acquaintances, 6 per cent for relatives, 11 per cent for 
neighbours, and the remaining 47 per cent on a self-employed basis for people previously unknown 
to them. The important finding, therefore, is that the majority (83 per cent) of undeclared work in 
Bulgaria is undertaken on an own-account basis and 36 per cent for close social relations. This is 
similar to the findings in previous studies of the EU28 as a whole (Williams 2014a).  
Which population groups, therefore, are more likely to participate in undeclared work? And 
what are their views on the sanctions, probability of being caught and the acceptability of operating 
in the undeclared economy (i.e., their tax morale)? Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. This 
reveals that men are far more likely to participate in undeclared work than women (13.4 per cent 
compared with 6.2 per cent). So too are those cohabiting more likely than married and single persons 
to engage in undeclared work, as are those living in larger households compared with smaller 
households. There are, however, few differences by age, except for those aged over 65 years old 
who are far less likely to participate in undeclared work. Turning to employment status, 26.4 per 
cent of the unemployed and 23.8 per cent of the self-employed engage in undeclared work. Other 
groups such as employees, the retired and students are less likely to do so. There is also a tendency 
for those struggling to cope financially to be far less likely to participate in undeclared work, and it 
is similarly the case that participation in undeclared work is polarised at the extremes of the income 
spectrum (i.e., among those with no formal income and the highest levels of formal income). 
Undeclared work also appears to be more prevalent in rural areas and villages than in more urban 
areas, and also much less prevalent in some regions (i.e., the North Eastern and South Western 
regions) than the rest of the country.    
 Examining the association of participation in undeclared work with the perceptions of the 
risk of detection, it appears that those who perceive there to be a low risk of detection are 
significantly more likely to engage in undeclared work, although no discernible trend appears to be 
apparent and so far as sanctions are concerned, although there appears to be a slightly greater 
likelihood that those who perceive the sanctions as lower are more likely to engage in undeclared 
work. There does, however, appear to be clear relationship between participation in undeclared work 
and tax morale. The higher is the level of tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of participating in 
undeclared work.    
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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To evaluate whether there is a statistically significant association between participation in 
undeclared work and these explanatory variables when the control variables are introduced and held 
constant, as well as whether any of these control variables are significantly associated with 
participation in undeclared work, Table 2 reports the results of a logit marginal effects regression 
analysis.     
Starting with the control variables and thus which employee groups should be perhaps 
targeted by inspectors seeking to tackle participation in undeclared work, the finding in model 1 is 
that gender is strongly statistically significant; men are significantly more likely than women to 
participate in undeclared work. Given that these are marginal effects, Table 2 thus displays that 
women are 6 per cent less likely to carry out undeclared work compared with men, holding all other 
variables constant. Employment status, meanwhile, is also significantly associated with 
participation in undeclared work. Employees and the economically inactive such as students and the 
retired are significantly less likely than the unemployed to participate in undeclared work. Indeed, 
the employed are 14 per cent less likely to engage in undeclared work than the unemployed, and the 
economically inactive are 15 per cent less likely to do so than the unemployed. Age, however, is not 
found to be associated with participation in undeclared work, and neither is marital status or 
household size. Nor is there any statistically significant relationship between participation in 
undeclared work and their financial situation or their personal income. Importantly, therefore, 
undeclared work is not significantly associated with poverty or a difficult financial situation. 
Although no significant variations exist across urban and rural locality types, those living in the 
South Central region are 4.9 per cent more likely to engage in undeclared work than those in the 
North Central region, and those in the South Eastern region 6.7 per cent more likely than those in 
the North Central region. Undeclared work is therefore concentrated among men who are self-
employed and unemployed and living in the South Central and South Eastern regions. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the policy measures, the important finding in model 1 is that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between participation in undeclared work and either the level of sanctions 
(refuting H1a) or the probability of being caught (refuting H1b). However, tax morale is a strong 
significant predictor of the propensity to participate in undeclared work (confirming H2). The higher 
the tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of engagement in the undeclared economy. Indeed, the 
marginal effects reveal that there is a 2.7 percentage point increase in the probability of conducting 
undeclared work for each one percentage point lowering in tax morale. These results, therefore, 
refute the rational economic actor deterrence perspective adopted by many governments and 
validate the emergent social actor perspective.   
Is it the case however, that decreases in the level of engagement in the undeclared economy 
would be greater if the government were to combine the social actor and rational economic actor 
approaches? Model 2 in Table 2 introduces the interaction terms between tax morale and the level 
of sanctions and probability of being caught respectively, in order to investigate if the effects of 
these two deterrence measures have a different impact on engaging in the undeclared economy at 
varying levels of tax morale. The finding in model 2 is that the effect of the perceived sanctions on 
the likelihood of engaging in the undeclared economy is not significantly different at varying levels 
of tax morale (refuting H3a). Similarly, the interaction term between the probability of being caught 
and tax morale is not significant overall (refuting H3b). Table 3 provides a summary of which 
hypotheses have been confirmed and which not.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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To further portray the effects of the significant explanatory variable of tax morale on the likelihood 
of participation in undeclared work, Figure 1 outlines the predicted probabilities based on a 
³representative´ Bulgarian citizen engaging in undeclared work, according to their gender which is 
also found to be a significant control variable. This ³representative´ worker is defined using mean 
and modal values of the remaining predictors. The finding is that the probability of the representative 
man engaging in undeclared work is higher than for a woman at all levels of tax morale, and that as 
tax morale worsens, the probability of participating in undeclared work increases for both men and 
women. For men, for example, the probability of engaging in undeclared work ranges from seven 
in a 100 for those with the highest tax morale to 62 in a 100 for those with the lowest tax morale, 
and for women from four in a 100 to 46 in a 100 respectively. Tax morale, therefore, has a strong 
and significant impact on the likelihood of the representative man and woman engaging in 
undeclared work. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Evaluating the validity of the conventional rational economic actor perspective and the social actor 
perspective, the finding is that engagement in the undeclared economy in Bulgaria is not influenced 
by either the sanctions of probability of being caught, but is significantly associated with the level 
of tax morale. Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, therefore, when the norms, values 
and beliefs of citizens do not adhere to those of the state in terms of the codified laws and 
regulations, there is a higher likelihood of them engaging in the undeclared economy. Increasing 
the perceived or actual level of sanctions and probability of being caught confronting citizens has 
no impact on the likelihood of them engaging in undeclared work. Neither do sanctions or the 
probability of being caught have any significantly different effects at varying levels of tax morale. 
It is not the case, therefore, that for those with lower tax morale for example, greater sanctions and 
higher probabilities of being caught have a greater effect. The currently dominant deterrence 
approach based on a rational economic actor model therefore needs to be replaced by a tax morale 
approach.  
 Theoretically, therefore, these findings support the emergent explanation of the undeclared 
economy grounded in institutional theory that undeclared work results from a violation of the social 
contract between the state and its citizens (Williams and Horodnic 2015a). The undeclared economy 
put another way, arises when the norms, values and beliefs of citizens (citizen morale) do not align 
ZLWKWKHFRGLILHGODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQVRIDVRFLHW\¶VIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVWDWHPorale). The wider is 
the gap between state morale and citizen morale (and thus the lower is the level of tax morale), the 
higher is the likelihood of engagement in the undeclared economy. As such, this analysis provides 
a quantitative reinforcement for a burgeoning view that participation in undeclared work in Bulgaria 
is in large part due to the lack of alignment of citizen morale with state morale (BICA 2011; CSD 
2009). Whether similar findings are identified in other countries now needs to be investigated, 
perhaps using the same Eurobarometer data-set. What is not known from this study is why do not 
agree with the codified laws and regulations and why undeclared work is viewed as socially 
legitimate, despite being illegal in terms of the laws and regulations. Although one view is that this 
might be because Bulgarian citizens commonly view the laws and regulations of formal institutions 
as made for the benefit of the ruling classes, exemplified by them legitimately evading tax through 
legal tax avoidance schemes, there has until now been little in-depth research to evaluate whether 
this is the case. Future research, therefore, could usefully evaluate whether this is the case using in-
depth qualitative research of the reasons for citizens not agreeing with the laws and regulations. 
 Turning to the policy implications, this study strongly suggests that the deterrence approach 
based on the rational economic actor model needs to be replaced by a social actor perspective that 
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seeks to improve tax morale. What policy measures are thus required to improve tax morale? Given 
that tax morale is a measure of the lack of alignment of the laws, codes and regulations of formal 
institutions and the norms, beliefs and values of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 
Webb et al. 2009), two sets of policy initiatives might be used to reduce the asymmetry between the 
formal institutions (³state morale´) and informal institutions (³civic morale´), and thus improve tax 
morale and in doing so, reduce engagement in the undeclared economy. 
 On the one hand, policy initiatives are required that seek to alter the norms, values and beliefs 
regarding the acceptability of participating in undeclared work. Firstly, campaigns can be designed 
to raise awareness about the benefits of working in the declared economy and the costs of 
participating in undeclared work, and secondly, policy initiatives can be pursued to educate citizens 
about the benefits of taxation in terms of the public goods and services received for the taxes they 
pay. These measures might range from introducing into school education in the civics curriculum 
the issue of taxation, through to sending letters to taxpayers about how their taxes are being spent, 
to putting up signs in hospitals, roads and schools for instance, stating ³Paid for by your taxes´. A 
recent example in Bulgaria is the ³Coming into the Light´ initiative of the Bulgarian Industrial 
Capital Association (see Williams 2014a). 
 On the other hand, however, the reform of formal institutions is also required, especially in 
Bulgaria where formal institutional deficiencies such as public sector corruption and state capture 
produce a lack of trust in government. Indeed, informal institutions are unlikely to change unless 
there are changes in the formal institutions. At the very minimum, this requires a change in the 
organisational culture of tax and labour inspectorates. Until now, the rational economic actor model 
based on increasing sanctions and the probability of being caught has manifested itself in a ³cops 
and robbers´ approach whereby citizens are viewed by the tax and labour inspectorates as criminals 
to be caught. It is an approach grounded in a low-trust, adversarial and low-commitment view of 
citizens. To improve tax morale and institutional symmetry, a more ³customer service-orientated´ 
approach is thus required founded upon a high trust-high commitment culture. To achieve this, at 
least three changes are necessary in formal institutions so that citizens have greater trust in 
government. As previous studies elsewhere reveal, tax morale improves when citizens view 
government as treating them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner (Gangl et al. 2013; 
Murphy 2005); when they view themselves as paying their fair share compared with others 
(Kirchgässner 2010, 2011; Molero and Pujol 2012), and believe that they receive the goods and 
services that they deserve given the taxes they pay (McGee 2005). Ensuring that citizens perceive 
themselves as receiving their fair share compared with others and being treated equitably and 
impartially is therefore a necessary perquisite for tackling participation in undeclared work. Beyond 
this, however, it also requires changes in the macro-level economic and social conditions that lead 
to lower tax morale, which wider cross-national studies reveal means increasing the level of 
expenditure on active labour market policies to support vulnerable groups and the level of 
expenditure on social protection (Autio and Fu 2015; Dau and Cuervo-Cazzurra 2014; Thai and 
Turkina 2014).  
 These findings about the need for a social actor perspective and greater focus upon tax 
morale, however, are based on just one dataset in one country. Further studies in other countries 
regarding the effectiveness of these different perspectives towards explaining and tackling the 
undeclared economy are now required. These studies, moreover, need to identify in a richer more 
nuanced manner the reasons for the distrust in formal institutions. If this paper thus stimulates such 
deeper evaluations in a range of countries of the effectiveness of these contrasting theoretical and 
policy perspectives, then it will have fulfilled one of its intentions. If this then stimulates 
governments to consider alternative approaches other than simply treating participants as rational 
economic actors and deterring participation in undeclared work by increasing the sanctions and 
probability of being caught, then it will have fulfilled its wider intention. 
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Table 1. Participation in undeclared work in Bulgaria (weighted percentages) 
 
All 10.0% 
Gender  
Male 13.4% 
Female 6.2% 
Age Groups 
 
15 - 24 years 11.7% 
25 - 34 years 12.7% 
35 - 44 years 12.0% 
45 - 54 years 11.2% 
55 - 64 years 12.9% 
65 years+ 1.5% 
Marital status  
Married/Remarried 8.5% 
Cohabitating 17.2% 
Single 9.0% 
Household Size  
One 7.3% 
Two 6.9% 
Three 10.7% 
Four or more 13.1% 
Occupation  
Unemployed 26.4% 
Self-employed 23.8% 
Employed 8.6% 
Other (Retired, students, disabled, 
etc.) 4.8% 
Financial situation 
 
Very comfortable 22.4% 
Just comfortable 11.7% 
Maintaining 9.0% 
Struggling 9.0% 
Personal income  
No income 17.4% 
Less than 350 euros 7.7% 
350-700 euros 8.8% 
700-1000 euros 7.1% 
More than 1000 euros 20.4% 
City size 
 
Rural area 12.1% 
Small/medium town 9.5% 
City 8.1% 
Regions 
 
North Central 12.5% 
North Eastern 5.0% 
North Western 11.7% 
South Central 13.3% 
South Eastern 13.3% 
South Western 5.8% 
Tax morale 
 
Upper quartile 4.8% 
Upper middle quartile 3.6% 
Lower middle quartile 11.8% 
Lowest quartile 19.6% 
Detection risk 
 
Very small 15.1% 
Fairly small 8.1% 
Fairly high/Very high 7.4% 
Expected sanctions 
 
Tax or social security 
contributions due 9.8% 
Plus a fine/ Prison 8.3% 
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Table 2. Logit marginal effects of the likelihood of participating in undeclared work in Bulgaria 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Tax morale 0.027*** (0.003) 0.029*** (0.006) 
Probability caught (BG: Very small/ Fairly small):   
- Fairly high/Very high -0.029 (0.018) -0.046 (0.032) 
Expected sanctions (BG: Tax or social security 
contributions due):   
- Plus a fine/ Prison -0.012 (0.018) 0.000 (0.026) 
Interaction term   
- Fairly high/Very high* Tax morale  0.006 (0.009) 
- Plus a fine/ Prison* Tax morale  -0.004 (0.007) 
Female -0.060*** (0.014) 
-0.059*** 
(0.014) 
Age -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Marital status (BG: Married/Remarried):   
- Cohabitating 0.030 (0.024) 0.030 (0.024) 
- Single 0.011 (0.019) 0.011 (0.019) 
Household Size: (BG: One Person):   
- Two -0.001 (0.025) -0.001 (0.025) 
- Three 0.016 (0.028) 0.015 (0.028) 
- Four or more 0.003 (0.027) 0.003 (0.027) 
Employment status (BG: Unemployed):   
- Self-employed -0.042 (0.063) -0.045 (0.062) 
- Employed 
-0.142*** (0.041) 
-0.144*** 
(0.042) 
 - Other (Retired, students, disabled, etc.) 
-0.151*** (0.035) 
-0.153*** 
(0.035) 
Financial situation (BG: Very comfortable):   
- Just comfortable -0.072 (0.057) -0.070 (0.057) 
- Maintaining -0.075 (0.058) -0.073 (0.058) 
- Struggling -0.069 (0.059) -0.068 (0.059) 
Personal income (BG: No income):   
- Less than 350 euros 0.008 (0.025) 0.009 (0.025) 
- 350-700 euros 0.006 (0.030) 0.007 (0.029) 
- 700-1000 euros -0.007 (0.034) -0.006 (0.034) 
- More than 1000 euros 0.059 (0.045) 0.061 (0.045) 
Type of locality (BG: Rural area):   
- Small/medium town -0.014 (0.019) -0.014 (0.019) 
- City -0.005 (0.018) -0.005 (0.018) 
Regions (BG: North Central):   
- North Eastern -0.027 (0.026) -0.026 (0.026) 
- North Western 0.010 (0.028) 0.013 (0.029) 
- South Central 0.049* (0.026) 0.049* (0.026) 
- South Eastern 0.067** (0.031) 0.068** (0.031) 
- South Western -0.028 (0.022) -0.027 (0.022) 
Number of imputations  50 50 
N 2005 2005 
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Table 3. Evaluation of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Result (p<0.01)  
H1: The higher the perceived sanctions and risk of being caught, the 
lower is the likelihood of engagement in the undeclared economy. 
 
H1a: The higher the perceived sanctions, the lower the likelihood of 
engagement in the undeclared economy. 
Not confirmed 
H1b: The higher the perceived risks of being caught, the lower the 
likelihood of engagement in the undeclared economy. 
Not confirmed 
H2: The higher is tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of engagement 
in the undeclared economy. 
Confirmed 
H3: The effect of the perceived sanctions and risk of being caught on the 
likelihood of engaging in the undeclared economy varies at different 
levels of tax morale. 
 
H3a: The effect of perceived sanctions on the likelihood of engaging 
in the undeclared economy varies at different tax morale. 
Not confirmed 
H3b: The effect of the perceived risk of being caught on the 
likelihood of engaging in the undeclared economy varies at 
different levels of tax morale. 
Not confirmed 
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Figure 1. 3UHGLFWHGSUREDELOLW\RISDUWLFLSDWLRQLQXQGHFODUHGZRUNRIDµUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶Bulgarian 
citizen: by tax morale and gender 
 
 
 
